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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction by virtue of this appeal being 
transferred from the Supreme Court. Utah Code, 1953, Title 78, Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Did the district court err: 
I. (a) In initially declining to grant the appellant's cross-motion for 
summary judgment on the undisputed facts? 
(b) In interposing an implied covenant of "good faith and fair 
dealing"? 
(c) In rewriting the contract to contain a term that permission cannot 
6 
be "unreasonably" withheld? 
II. (a) In failing to grant a mandatory injunction as the only adequate 
remedy for the continuing nuisance? 
(b) In denying relief for a lack of perceived damages? 
III. Assuming arguendo, damages were appropriate, in awarding nominal 
damages without giving appellant the opportunity to introduce 
evidence of actual damages? 
IV. In failing to direct reimbursement of appellant's legal fees and 
expenses? 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for motions for summary judgment, whereby the 
court views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the non-moving party, would be applicable to both parties as each 
cross-moved for such relief and the district court found in part for each. As both 
represented to the court no triable material issues of fact existed, no inference or 
favoritism should be granted either. 
The issue being one of law, the relevant language of the contract not being 
ambiguous, this court reviews it for correctness, giving the trial courts construction 
and findings no particular weight or deference. Cooper State Leasing v. Blacker 
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770 P.2d 88 (Utah 1989): Nielsen V. Neilsen 780 P.2d 1264 (Utah 1989);Holladay 
Duplex v. Howells 47 P.3d 104 (UT App. 2002). 
Had the district court applied controlling law and found for the appellant, its 
failure to award attorney's fees is to be reviewed on the standard of an abuse of 
discretion. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court, on cross-motions for 
summary judgment. The issues involve enforcement of the Covenants, Conditions 
& Restrictions (CC&Rs) of a community in which both parties reside on adjoining 
lots. The controlling CC&R regarding "FENCES" requires the prior permission of 
all adjoining property owners, of which the appellant is one. Appellees erected a 
fence, on the common property lines, without the requisite consent. This action 
was brought to enforce the applicable CC&R, requesting abatement of the nuisance 
by the removal of the fence. The district court found in the alternative for each 
party but essentially denied appellant injunctive relief or actual damages. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Subsequent to the appellant's submission of the original memorandum in 
opposition to appellees' motion for summary judgment and in support of his cross-
motion, with typographical errors (R. 123-126), appellant submitted a corrected 
set of papers, essentially the same (R. 180-221). In this brief, all references will be 
made to the corrected second set. 
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Each party expressly stated there are no material facts that are in dispute. 
These facts are: 
Appellant, appellees, and the Martins were contiguous neighbors in the 
residential community of Ranch Place, Utah (R.2, 178). Ranch Place adopted and 
filed CC&Rs, one of which governs "Fencing" (Sec. 7.5) (R.2). The final 
sentence of said section makes permission from adjacent owners, prior to the 
installation of a fence along common lot lines, mandatory (R.182). 
The appellees met the first requirement by obtaining approval of the fence 
design from the Architectural Committee of the HOA (R.95). Appellees failed to 
comply with the second requirement, viz.; they did not obtain permission from two 
of four adjacent lot owners, both of whom objected to the fence as built (R.2, 178-
179,181,183). 
Appellees not only had constructive notice of the CC&Rs (R.185), but had 
actual knowledge that consent of adjoining neighbors was required, prior to 
installing their fence (R. 186-187, 256,257). 
In appellant's four day absence and without prior notice (R.168 para. 6, 
174), appellees erected a 300 ft. long, 3 tier log fence, over four feet high, 
completely sided with wire mesh, enclosing a rear area of approximately 7700 sq. 
ft. (R. 4,168,183). The fence virtually closed off the remaining open side of 
appellant's triangular rear yard, (R.169). 
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There are no fences at any other homes on appellant's street or in the 
vicinity of appellees' home (R. 170). The fence is much less than fifty feet from 
appellant's dwelling (R. 168). Allegation 22 of the complaint, that the fence was 
erected and existed in violation of the CC&Rs (R. 4) was admitted in paragraph 1 
of appellees' Answer (R. 13). 
The permission requirement is not ambiguous and is unconditional (R. 185). 
It was never waived (R.189). The requirement of permission from adjoining 
neighbors is presently being expressly set forth in all design approvals of the 
Architectural Committee (R.192, 212). 
Regarding other existing fences further away in Ranch Place, it has to be 
concluded that they were erected with permission of adjacent neighbors, as no 
objections to them were made (R.188). The testimony of the vice president of the 
HOA (now president), Mr. Johnson, was that he knew of only one incident in the 
community where a fence was erected without seeking the permission of the 
adjoining owners (R.257 para. 15,112-113), and no one objected thereto. 
Appellees, after the fact, in an attempt to excuse their violation, invoked a 
"Variance" procedure. Such procedure was inapplicable as it is expressly limited 
to issues of "design", CC&R 3.3 (R.183), which issue was not present (R.186, 
Decision R.283). Appellant also noted additional legal objections fatal to such 
"Variance" meeting, (R.192-193, 254-255,259). These were filed with the HOA 
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counsel prior to the meeting (R. 214-215). At the "Variance" meeting 64 members 
voted in favor of the variance. No one voted in opposition, as urged by the 
appellant, in protest to the illegitimate meeting, although appellant, Martin, and 
many others were present. Neighbors also knew no vote at all, amounted to a vote 
against, as appellees had the burden of getting sufficient votes (R. 254). 
Even if the procedure were available, there are 228 lot owners in Ranch 
Place and a vote of 64 in favor out of a membership of 228 (R.183, 253-254) did 
not achieve the required majority of 115 (R. 191, 254). 
Additionally, appellees violated the maximum height provisions set forth in 
Sec. 7.5 (R.185, 95). Every one of the 43 fence posts exceeds four feet (R.265). 
A violation of the CC&Rs is expressly deemed a nuisance and subject to 
abatement by any other owner. (CC&R 10.1 (R.189). 
DISTRICT COURT DECISION 
The court essentially made three distinct rulings. First, the court found in 
favor of the appellees based on its evaluation of the reasonableness of the 
appellant's objection. It stated it may have ruled for appellant had it found the 
reasons for appellant's aesthetic objections were more to its liking. Second, it held 
the permission requirement was not a "design" element, which would be subject to 
the variance procedure. Without any evidence in the record as to the actual 
measurements of any other fences, appellees represented six (of the 228 home sites 
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in R anch Place) w ei e o v ei four feet (R 251 para. 3) Based on this, the district 
enurl rmirlihlnl (lirtv w v\ i \ rn \n In llio H( I A 'iiiil ;i nia|niil\ ol lis nu'inln.1! . oil 
the height restriction. 
In its third and final ruling; the district court found in the alternative, that if 
its first two theories upon winch it based its opinion were incorrect, appellant was 
enlitk'-il l' dijiiuiiies oi'onr ilwllin l( denial counsel fees. 
Sigiuficaiith llio lo\*"< - i" "' 'Decision R 282-2X4 I did nuiL Ilk1 
following findings: 
\ Feu properties in the parties5 immediate neighborhood are fenced. 
i i It acknow ledged appellant's claim " .he would never have' bought 
h is pi opei ty if lie believed his neignoors could erect an ddjwnnnr 
thin/ o\ 01 hh uhjeiliuii *(K 2K \ i | HR; t't mt I tailul . • 
appellant and his archil:^ ' \l uii (lir \\u ( (linil (lie RMI yard 
could not be fenced off without his permission, in deciding the type of 
house lie would build (a rambler) and its location on the lot (R.169)]. 
C i \ppellai it had no notice of the construction of the fence until after 
it was complete d 
COMMEN rS ON DISTR IC I CO' t J R I 'S DECISION 
The appellees5 application for the fence stated it was to contain their newly-
acquired puppy (R.94). Besides their initial application, on several other occasions 
thereafter (R.83, 194-195, 230) appellees gave as their reason for the installation of 
the fence, the protection of their newly acquired puppy. Their statement that 
appellant wanted to use the appellees' property to exercise his dog was only 
belatedly asserted by the appellees after appellant objected to their fence. This 
accusation was denied by appellant (R.194). In any event, such subjective excuse 
was not a reason to violate the CC&Rs, as a matter of law. Appellees claimed 
motivation for the fence is no more relevant than appellant's or the Martins 
subjective reason for objecting to it. 
If indeed there was any merit to appellees' contention that appellant's dog 
trespassed on their rear lawn, they had other more appropriate remedies available 
to them, both civil and criminal, none of which were pursued, i.e., action for 
declaratory judgment, nuisance, injunction, trespass, etc. It is not justification, as a 
matter of law, to violate the CC&Rs. 
The court created issues where none existed and then made findings thereof 
to try and justify its desired resolution, ignored non-disputed facts, and speculated 
as to the result of situations that might occur in the future. It ignored that a 
person's home being unique, monetary damages were not adequate and on its own 
determined, there was no diminution in value of appellant's real estate, without any 
evidence before it or the opportunity given to the appellant to introduce such 
evidence. 
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I In: u nil ( conjee! mi cil about the applicability of proxies. I here never were 
petitions obtained by appellees ringinp doorbells throughout the neighbor!] o--- \ 
pitching their cause, without opportunity of appellant to be present or respond, and 
asking residents to sign a paper long before a "Vari.an.ce" meeting was ever called, 
MI i i o d c c o f (lii" t t ieef i t tg s cn l < . n delined <K t(8). 
The record is devoid of an> statement *-v . . « - . • . r 
announced and by what vote it favored one party or the other, Further; I lie 
"Variance" vote could only count those present. Unlike other sections of the 
C i..&Rs, voting by proxy was not authorized (R.190-191. 254 para, 9), 
I'IK: IIKII" II I 11HIII's subsequent statement that it would, not be unreasonable 
proper* \ i- unpaired b> the installation of the fence, ignore/ \\v- - * : ^ 
the Martins' affidavit (R. i 79 para. 10). The district court necessarily and 
erroneously found that the closing in of appellant's relatively small triangular rear 
) at ci (R 169) w ith a I , 700 square foot pen close to in* home and deck, was not an. 
interference \wfli IIH enjtn itienf am! ntlme ml Ins pmpah. ^ a iiulki ol l.iw. 
The finding of "a dispute" as to whether Hn Marlins (>;ive iKTiiiiv u ir 
inexplicable as appellees acknowledged they never sought nor obtained - no 
Martins' permission and the Martins' affidavit expressly states they did not (R.i79, 
para. 7). The district court questioned the reasonableness of appellant's failure to 
give permission but never addressed the reasonableness of the Martins' objection. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
A controlling CC&R in the community where appellant and appellees reside 
was knowingly violated by appellees. The district court, interjecting an implied 
condition of "fair dealings and good faith", accepted a disputed subjective excuse 
for the violation. Such implied condition is inapplicable to the case at bar. 
Although conflicting conclusions in a decision are abhorrent to the law, in 
the alternative the court found that the appellant may have been entitled to a 
summary judgment but erred in failing to grant injunctive relief to remedy the 
continuing nuisance. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I A 
THE DISTRICT COURT, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, PROPERLY 
GRANTED APPELLANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Restricting covenants constitute a binding and enforceable contract 
(Brighton v. Ward 31 P.3d 594 (Utah 2002)) (Decision R.283). 
If the restricting covenant is not ambiguous, the court's duty is only to make 
application thereof to the evidence: 
Holladay Duplex v. Howells 2002 UT App. 125,47 P.3d 104 
15 
Freem..: ' 3 
Hayes v.Gibbb l u Li 54, lo9r.2d75i
 V i ^ V ; 
"Generally, unambiguous restrictive covenants should be enforced as 
written >wenson?. (supra, para. 11 ^  "It is [this] court's duty to enforce 
i »l (lie |Kiilies us expressed in the plain language of the 
•• •*•• •- '-v hwnuti l ' K"(;'uLiln „ .. ;^.. "Piopcils 
owners who purchase land in such developments ha\ •+.- d 'h* 4 il'onv 
such covenants against other owners who violate them."" (See Crimmins v. 
Simonds 636 P. 2d 478, 479 (Utah Sup 1981) 
"Where a purchaser has notice oi the restriction . .he ^ . \<\ le with 
knowledge of (lie purpose \. . c, 
962. Adopted in Utah in Hayes \ iJ :hh< r ^ nnr
 f ' ». 
"Persons who own property in a neighborhood subject lo lo&lnctive 
covenants are entitled lo rely on the covenants according to their terms, e\en n 
so::/J {;i me ncigjibors no longer desire their enforcement." Crimmins v Simonds 
(supra, 481) See also Sw ei ison \ Ei ickson (supra) 
There is no issue th. l .« .. ' 
without the requisite permission after constructive and actual knowledge of its 
controlling CC&R 7.5 requirement (R.186-187, 256-257). 
Point IB 
THE PRINCIPLE OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING WAS 
MISAPPLIED. 
The district court erroneously interjected a theory of an implied covenant of "good 
faith and fair dealing". Under the facts of the case at bar, such principle is 
inapplicable. It is foreign to the fundamental law of contracts that their terms can 
be rewritten under the guise of applying such theory. This principle is summed up 
on Corpus Juris at 17A CJS Sec. 346, pages 378-9 as follows. 
".. .where a contract is clear and seemingly complete, the courts 
will not and cannot revise, extend, or enlarge it by 
implication... Furthermore, the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing cannot be used to imply an obligation which would 
completely obliterate a right expressly provided by the written 
contract; stated otherwise, the obligation of good faith and fair 
dealing cannot be constructed so broadly as to effectively nullify 
other express terms of the contract. Accordingly, the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing does not impose any duty 
that is contrary to the express terms of the contract. A term which 
the parties have not expressed is not to be implied merely because 
the court thinks it is a reasonable term, or because the contract is 
advantageous to one party and unjust to the other; and a person 
may not be required to do what he did not promise, merely because 
what he did promise was not sufficient to meet the requirements 
of some real or supposed public policy." 
Where there are no express covenants or promises in a contract, compelling 
a party to act in a particular manner, ".. .there can be no implied covenants or 
promises to do the same." Scare v. University of Utah 882 P. 2d 673 (1994). See: 
Olympus Hills Shopping Center v. Smith's Food 889 P.2d 445 (Utah 1994). 
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A court, by interposing theories of implied covenants of good faith and fair 
dealing in a o iihacl has iht1 poleitlial nfdislorlmi.' wed established piinuples of 
contract law, which are not sustainable Benibe N Fashion Center 771 1* ,\l 10" '^  
(Sup. Utah 1989), relating to termination of employment; Beck v. Farmers 
Insurance Exchange 701 P.2d 795 (Sup, Utah 1985), relating to insurer's duty to 
S L ; ; J U w lc l l i i iS . 
- .•; ,- i . ..
 4 •<, < ,.:i. '64), relating to a 
contract for reai - , - i Ogden 
he court's eqiut} powers do not permit it to fashion a remedy 
•.' out reference \o the terms of the underl) nig transaction.... 
Although we sympathize with the trial judge's effort, to do equity; 
that effort must fail for several reasons 
/ v cutii t uucb jiui iu: . vji ic oiaiiene io refoin transaction 
to include terms thai it believes are fair. Its discretion is narrowly 
bounded. Reformation may be appropriate where both parties were 
mistaken as to a term of the contract, or where one party is mistaken 
and the other partv is <nnltv of inequitable condi ict " 
The covenant of good faith does not " establish new independent rights or 
duties IIDI agreed upon by the parties, nor may the covenant be used to nullify a 
(Referring to Brihaj . . .: .. i-= -*..*» : . { 
Farm Bureau 19 P.3d 392 (Ct. of App. 2001); See also Rio Algoni (\w\\ In 
Ltd., 618 P.2d 497 (Sup. Utah 1980); Malibu Investment v. Sparks 2000 Utah 30, 
996 P.2d 1043; Howe v. Professional Manivest, 829 P.2d 160,163 (Utah 1992). 
Express covenants relating to a specific contract right exclude the possibility 
of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature, Ted R. Brown v. 
Carnes 753 P.2d 964. (Utah Ct. of App. 1988) 
In order to find bad faith and unfair dealings in a contractual relationship, 
there must be circumstances to establish that one party did something substantial to 
prevent the other party from performing its obligations (Zions Properties, Inc. v. 
Holt 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah Sup. 1975). As a matter of law, appellant cannot be held 
to have prevented appellees from obtaining the requisite permission that was never 
even requested of him or the Martins. Had the appellees made such a request, 
there was a likelihood that something could have been worked out. 
It appears the district court strained to apply the theory of good faith and 
fair dealing to try and arrive at what it perceived to be the popular position 
reflected in the abortive variance vote. This was the result of false publicity and 
door-to-door personal canvassing by appellees around the neighborhood, which 
depicted appellant as the villain for his reliance upon the CC&Rs. This influenced 
many residents of the neighborhood, the great majority of whom were unaffected 
by the fence. 
On the subject of interpretation of language as creating conditions or 
19 
[Minimises, tin1 Itiillimn ing is sl.ilul in W illiston on Contracts, Fourth edition, Sec. 
km eve?. JI- un jrpretation cannot be employed as a means of 
reducing the risk of forfeiture under a contract if the occurrence of 
the event as a condition is expressed in unmistakable language. The 
parties are entitled to the benefit of their bargain, and the mere fact 
it turns out to have been a bad bargain for one of the parties does not 
justify, through artful interpretation, changing the clear meaning of the 
parties5 ^ vri.." 
I h c d N i u l min i s division nuki's no i d b n i t r in ;m> hhMrli h\ iippdliinl 
of any specific contractual obligation. It cannot be said appellant did anivf hint1 ir 
failed to do anything regarding the fence except fail to give his permission for its 
installation along the remaining open side of his triangular rear property line, the 
other side alreau. ..... i,.r ;,een previous obstructed b\ a Mi>eu uiiu be. m i 
trees a nd plant - • . ...n 
circumstances, wln^u uppcncr: K- ! * - ^iv • i 
dealings or lack of good faith. 
" A duty of good faith does not mean that a party vested with a 
clear right is obligated to exercise that right to its own detriment 
for the purpose of benefiting another party to the contract. A court 
will not enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the contract 
itself (citation)"5 Rio Algom Corp. v Jimco 1 td 618 P ?H 497, 505 
Utah's position is in keeping with the majoritj of ji irisdicti 3iis v* - hi : li 
decline to find a breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
absent a breach of an express term of a contract. Burger King v. Weaver 169 F.3d 
2 : 
1310, 11th Circuit 1999, applying Florida law, (Cert, dismissed), 528 U.S. 948; 
Griffith v. Levi Straus 85 F.3d 185, 5th Circuit 1996 (applying Texas law); Amoco 
Oil v. Ervin 908 P.2d 493 (Colorado 1995). The duty of the Court is to declare the 
meaning of what is written in the instrument and not what it feels the language 
should have been. It is settled law when, without fraud or mistake, the written 
contract expresses the obligations of the parties. Such writing is not only the best 
but the only evidence of their agreement. Hicks v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co. 182 
Oklahoma 61, 76 P.2d 269 (Sup. 1938); Shiver v. Liberty Building-Loan Assn. 16 
Cal 2d 296, 106 P.2d 4 (Sup. 1940). 
It cannot be questioned that appellant was given the right to withhold his 
consent. Appellant had no contractual obligation to do or perform anything 
regarding the appellees' fence other than approve or disapprove it, if and when he 
was asked to give permission. 
"We will not interpret the covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
to make a better contract for the parties than they made for 
themselves, Rio Algom v Jimco (supra)..." Brown v. Moore 973 P.2d 
950 (Sup. Utah 1998) 
See also U. S. Pipe and Foundry v. American Arbitration 
Association, 67 N.J. (Sup. Ct. 384,170 A.2d 505 (New Jersey 1961) 
Point IC 
THE DISTRICT COURT IMPERMISSIBLY REWROTE 
THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT 
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Based upon its erroneous conclusion that the covenant oi good faith and fair 
dealing is applicable (IK » mnl lc-ipli'<»M,ACH In m^nnl ilie rnnii u ( hrhn i m Ill > 
pai ties. After the term, ".. .permission for the fencing shall be obtained from the 
adjacent Owner prior to installation", it altered the clear language by in effect 
adding, "Sue \ pji n\isMon cannot be unreasonably withheld " 
\A o\ isions oi the cC&Rs allow .an exception to the 
i . - : , - n i ^ f i H O I I ' M M I ^ Wm^VVi ' ' " ' Mill " U l l i l H H ^ l l l l 1 III'. 
unambiguous contract between the parties to condition the times when permission 
can be withheld and when it cannot _Yii example oi' this is when the district court 
engaged in evaluating the extent of aesthetic interference and the reasonableness of 
api^-iiam s objection. 
the parties, would be unwise or even operate unjustly. Chemical Construction 
Corp v. Continental Engineering 407 F.2d 989 (CA Ala); Conservative Federal 
Savings & Loan Assn. v. WarnecU ^ A<>, l.'« * v\ Ja 47L 470, 480; Cook v. 
l.illle < aesar , in i; ^1 fn * Ui,h Or .'(Kill), (,Lis;«, \ klaiieuso -M I S \\ Ai lo 1u8 
(Sup. MO 1%*)} /. • • 
"Hence, in order that an unexpressed term may be implied, 
the implication must arise from the language employed in the 
instrument or be indispensable to effectuate the intention of 
the parties... 
Accordingly, there can be no implication as against the express 
terms of the contract; and the courts will be careful not to imply 
a term, where the subject matter is completely covered by the 
contract or as to which the contract is intentionally silent." 
17ACJSSec. 34, pg. 378-9 
Where language is clear, "(t)he policy favoring freedom of contract 
requires that, within broad limits, the agreement of the parties should be honored, 
even though forfeiture results." Oppenheimer & Co., v. Oppenheim, Appel 86 
N.Y. 2d 865, 660 N.E. 2d 415,636 NYS 2d 734 (Court of Appeals-New York 
1995); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 229, page 185, comment A. 
"We also disagree with the trial judge's conclusion that plaintiff 
breached an implied covenant of the lease by unreasonably 
withholding its consent to defendant's use of the washing machine. 
Initially we note that the record does not contain any indication that 
defendant sought such permission. If authorization was not requested 
then it could not have been unreasonably withheld. Moreover, a 
covenant in a lease can arise by implication only from some specific 
language of the lease or because it is indispensable to carry into 
effect the purpose of the lease. Marini v. Ireland, 56 N.J. 130, 
143, 265 A.2d 526 (1970). The language of the subject lease is 
not ambiguous and thus does not give rise to any implication 
because of a required construction. It clearly and simply says 
that no washing machines may be installed by the tenant without 
the advance authorization of the landlord. To interpret such 
provision as meaning the landlord's permission would not be 
unreasonably withheld would amount to an impermissible 
rewriting of the lease agreement. 
See Brower v. Glen Wild Lake Co., 86 N.J. Super. 341, 346 
(App. Div. 1965), certif. den. 44 N.J. 399 (1965)." 
Housing Auth. Of City of E. Orange v. Mishoe, 493 A.2d 56, 201 N.J. Super. 352 
(1985) (Appellate Division). 
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Point IIA 
THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD HAVE EXERCISED ITS EQUITABLE 
POWERS TO RESTORE THE PARTIES TO STATUS QUO 
The violation was in fact and was deemed a continuing nuisance, CC&R 
10.1 (R.207). Abatement thereof by a mandatory injunction was the only adequate 
remedy. Stergios v. Forest Place HOA 651 S.W. 2d 396 (Tex. Ct. Appl. 1983). 
The courts of Utah uniformly enforce violations of restrictive covenants in 
subdivisions by permanent injunction. Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478 (Utah 
1981); Schick v. Perry, 12 Utah 2d 173, 364 P.2d 116 (1961); Leaver v. Grose, 610 
P.2d 1262 (Utah 1080). 
The breach of a restrictive covenant is an irreparable injury for which 
damages are estimated only by conjecture. The unique nature of a person's home, 
the interests of other lot owners in the subdivision and the integrity of the CC&Rs 
demonstrate the inadequacy of money damages. In such cases, courts of this state 
hold an injunction to be the only appropriate remedy to enforce covenants. 
"Enforcement of real covenants has virtually been subsumed by the 
modern practice of treating all covenants respecting land as equitable 
servitudes. The reasons for this transformation are the appropriateness of 
injunction remedies for the enforcement of property restrictions. ... The real 
basis for the enforcement of equitable servitudes is the doctrine that one who 
takes land with notice of a restriction thereon cannot in equity and good 
conscience be permitted to violate that restriction. ... Equitable relief in the 
form of an injunction is the usual means of enforcing an equitable 
servitude..." 
Thomas & Backman on Utah Real Property Law Sec. 1205 p. 546 
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In Utah County v. Baxter 635 P.2d 61 (Sup. Utah 1981) dealing with a 
zoning violation, the court held that a plaintiff need not make a showing of 
irreparable injury to obtain an injunction. Violation of a community CC&R should 
be treated no differently. 
"As a general proposition, property owners who have purchased land 
in a subdivision, subject to a recorded set of restrictive covenants and 
conditions, have the right to enforce such restrictions through equitable 
relief against property owners who do not comply with the stated 
restrictions. See Crimmins v. Simonds, 636 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah 1981) 
5 Williston on Contracts, 669 at 154 3 ed. 
The appellees have no standing to ask the court not to order removal of the 
fence as it was not erected in good faith. They installed the fence after actual 
knowledge that permission of all adjoining neighbors was required (R. 186-7,256-
7) never even requested the required permission of appellant and Martin and 
erected it during the only few days appellant was out of town that summer (R.168). 
"The defendant with full knowledge of the restriction deliberately 
attempted to override them.. .He took his chances as to the effect 
of his conduct with eyes open to the results which might ensue... 
Entrenchments behind considerable expenditures of money 
cannot shield premeditated efforts to evade or circumvent legal 
obligations from the salutary remedies of equity." 
Armstrong v. Leverone 136 A. 71,75-76 (Conn.1927) 
Real estate being unique, courts will restore the parties to status quo before 
the breach by directing the removal of the fence. The benefit of the doctrine of 
balancing the equities or relative hardship is reserved for the innocent defendant 
who proceeds without knowledge that he is violating the covenants. Where the 
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encroachment is deliberate and constitutes a willful interference with another's 
property rights, equity will require restoration to the prior status quo ".. .without 
regard to the relative inconvenience or hardship that might result from its 
removal." Papanikolas Bros. Enters v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc. 535 
P.2d 1256, 1259 (3) (Sup. Utah 1975). 
Point IIB 
IN ENFORCING RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS, INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IS 
NOT WITHHELD FOR LACK OF PERCEIVED DAMAGES 
This issue was specifically addressed in a decision of the Supreme Court of 
Connecticut in the case of Hartford Electric Light Co. v. Levitz, 173 Conn. 15, 376 
A.2D 381 (Sup. Ct. Conn. 1977). Therein the defendant objected to injunctive 
relief unless there was substantial and irreparable injury. 
After acknowledging the long line of authority supporting the general rule 
that ordinarily irreparable and substantial injury must be threatened before an 
injunction is issued, the court stated: 
"These and many other similar cases have been examined, and in none of 
them was an injunction which was sought to enforce a restrictive covenant 
refused for the lack of a threat of substantial irreparable injury. Cases 
involving enforcement of restrictive covenants show that in those actions a 
different standard is applied to the request for an injunction. 
"In Armstrong v. Leverone, supra, this court found no error in the granting 
of an injunction against violation of a restrictive covenant against business 
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use of certain property. It stated (p. 472) that "proof of special damage is 
not necessary, and if the act of the defendant transgresses the restriction it is 
a violation of the rights of the plaintiffs which is not dependent upon the 
existence or amount of damage. Berry on Restrictions on Use of Real 
Property, 413; Morrow v. Hasselman, 69 NJ. Eq. 612, 61 A. 369; Peck v. 
Conway, 119 Mass. 546." 
The Connecticut court also held that the defendant's substantial expenditures did 
not make injunctive relief inequitable, because they were made willfully after 
knowledge that he was violating the restrictions, to wit: 
"When one has gone on wrongfully in a willful invasion of another's rights 
in real property, the latter is entitled to have his property restored to its 
original condition even though the wrongdoer would thereby suffer great 
loss. It has been said that the result of denying a mandatory injunction in 
such a case would be to 'allow the wrongdoer to compel innocent persons to 
sell their rights at a valuation (citation).' " 
"The fact that the damage suffered by plaintiffs as a consequence 
of defendants' covenant violation was monetarily minimal does 
not preclude plaintiff from obtaining an injunction in view of 
plaintiffs' protectable interest in the residential integrity of their 
neighborhood and the enforceability of the covenants that help to 
sustain it. Liu v. Dunnigan, 25 Md. App. 178,333 A.2d 338 (1975); 
Pavia v. Medcalfe, 45 Misc.2d 597, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 447 (1965), 
aff d 26 A.D.2d 621,272 N.Y.S. 2d 716 (1966) [FN2]" See Crimmins v. 
Simonds 636 P.2d 478, *480 (Utah, 1981). 
In the case at bar, the court below indicated that it may have ruled in 
appellant's favor if it found appellant's aesthetic reasons more to its liking or was 
more impressed with appellant's claim of interference with his enjoyment of his 
home. The cases hold it is not the court's prerogative to weigh the extent of the 
perceived damage. 
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In Fink v. Miller 896 P.2d 649 (Utah 1995), this court in discussing the need 
for a showing of damages and the appropriateness of injunctive relief stated at 655, 
FN8.f 
"We also note that the trial court showed undue concern about the 
issue of 'irreparable harm'. While the element of harm must be met 
when considering the necessity for a temporary restraining order, see 
Utah R. Civ.P. 65A(b) (1), it is not essential to the court's decision to 
grant a permanent injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant. Property 
owners have a protectable interest in enforcing restrictive covenants 
through injunctive relief without a showing of harm. See Crimmins v. 
Simonds (supra) at 480, Hagemann v. Worth, 56 Wash. App. 85, 782 
P.2d 1072,1074 (1989); Morris v. Kadrmas, 812 P.2d 549, 554 (Wyo. 
1991)." 
Point IIC 
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, DAMAGES WERE APPROPRIATE, NO 
OPPORTUNITY WAS AFFORDED APPELLANT TO ESTABLISH THEM. 
This matter involves cross motions for summary judgment. As is invariably 
the case on motions for summary judgment, both sides directed their attention to 
issues of liability. Damages were not addressed. It seems too fundamental to 
require argument that if damages were the proper remedy, appellant should have 
had an opportunity to introduce evidence of the same. This is not to suggest in the 
case at bar that damages are adequate. The foregoing authorities establish, in cases 
of restrictive covenants, injunctive relief is appropriate. If however, liability was 
found and damages were to be awarded, a hearing should have been directed. 
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The record established that appellees built this imposing corral fence along 
appellant's rear property (R.183), closing off the only open remaining side of his 
rear triangular yard (R. 169). The lower court nevertheless held that there was no 
damage, or diminution of the value of appellant's home, as a matter of law. In 
alternatively granting appellant summary judgment, it determined, without any 
hearing, nominal damages of $1.00 to be fair compensation. 
"...Thus, the Campbells are entitled to an opportunity to prove 
that State Farm acted in bad faith and that, as a result, they suffered 
damages..." Campbell v. State Farm 840 P2d 130,142. See also 
Williams v. Barber 765 P.2d 887, 889. Hayes et al. v. Gibbs, et al., 
110 Utah 54 (1946), 169 P.2d 781. 
Point III 
ATTORNEYS' FEES AND LEGAL EXPENSES 
Appellant's complaint requested legal fees. Based upon the district court's 
erroneous conclusions, referred to herein, it declined to award appellant attorney 
fees and disbursements. It is respectfully submitted that had the district court 
applied controlling principles of law, attorney's fees would have been appropriate 
as provided in CC&R Sec. 10.2 (R.4). 
It is clear that it was a disregard by the appellees of the known CC&Rs that 
precipitated the events and proceedings culminating in this appeal. They chose not 
to discuss the contemplated fence with appellant or the Martins before erecting it 
and did it clandestinely in appellant's four day absence. The appellant did nothing 
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but exercise his right to object to this imposing fence after he was shocked to find 
it upon his return. In addition to his non-compensable time and effort, appellant 
has sustained thousands of dollars in legal fees and expenses seeking redress. To 
deny him reimbursement under such circumstances was an abuse of discretion. 
".. .However, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that 'a court has inherent 
equitable power to award reasonable attorney fees when it deems 
appropriate in the interest of justice and equity."' 
Stewart v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 1994). 
Courts use their equitable power to award attorney fees where a party 
has acted in bad faith. Rohan v. Boseman 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2002 UT 
app 109 46 P.3d 753. See also Cafferty v. Hughes 445 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
2002 UT app 105. In the case at bar the CC&Rs expressly provide for them. 
CONCLUSION 
The provision on "Fencing" was clear and known constructively and 
actually. 
The related history of the provision, when being adopted, was a compromise 
between one faction who wanted no fencing and those who were in favor of 
unrestricted fencing. The resolution was that a homeowner could erect fencing 
around his rear lot if his immediate neighbors did not object. 
If the community was of the opinion that a substantial fence could be erected 
on a common property line over the objection of an adjoining neighbor they could 
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have amended Sec. 7.5. To date this has not been done or even attempted. The 
permission requirement is still in the CC&Rs and now set forth to in all fence 
design approvals of the architectural committee. 
The appellees have furnished no legal reason why it should not be enforced. 
The subsequently claimed dog issue is irrelevant to the applicability of CC&R 7.5. 
On this appeal, it should be entitled to no recognition. 
Under the foregoing circumstances, no triable issue of fact has been raised 
by the defendants that would warrant a protracted and costly trial. The blatant 
disregard of the known requirements should not be excused. It is also important, 
that the enforceability of unambiguous CC&Rs, whose integrity hundreds of 
communities, in Utah (and a multitude of other states), rely upon in governing the 
workings of their associations, be preserved. 
As stated in the Swenson and Crimmins cases, persons who own property in 
a neighborhood subject to restrictive covenants are entitled to rely on them 
according to their terms even if some of the neighbors no longer desire their 
enforcement. CC&Rs constitute a contract and should be validated as such by the 
courts. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of January, 2003 
/^<^y _ 
. /George \>$ginsiein, Appellant Pro Se 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 3fl --day of January 2003,1 did personally 
hand deliver two true and exact copies of the foregoing Apellant's Brief to Thomas 
Howard, Esq. Attorney for Appellees, at 1725 Sidewinder Drive, Park City, Utah 
84060. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GEORGE WEINSTEIN, 
Plaintiff, RULING AND ORDER 
vs. 
RONALD POPIEL and JAMIE 
POPIEL, Civil No, 010600143 
Defendants. Judge Robert K. Hilder 
The parties cross Motions for Summary Judgment were argued to the court on May 6, 
2002, Mr. Joseph E. Tesch appeared for plaintiff, and Mr. Thomas L. Howard appeared for 
defendants. Following argument, the court took the matter under advisement Now, having 
considered the memoranda, affidavits, the arguments of counsel and applicable law, the court 
rules as follows: 
First, the court finds that the facts of the case have been fully developed, there are no 
genuine disputes about any material facts, and summary judgment is appropriate. In fact, any 
delay in resolving this matter would be a waste of the court's and the parties' resources, and it 
would unnecessarily prolong an already protracted neighborhood dispute. 
The relevant and established facts that control the court's decision include the following: 
The parties live in the Ranch Place subdivision. Their properties adjoin each other, in part. All 
properties and homeowners in Ranch Place are subject to Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions 
("CC&Rs") which were in place when both parties bought their respective properties, and at all 
times relevant to the dispute. Fencing of Ranch Place properties is subject to specific conditions 
intheCC&Rs. Until 2000, neither property was fenced. Many properties in Ranch Place are 
fenced, and many of the existing fences exceed the four foot height restriction. Few fences in the 
parties' immediate neighborhood are fenced, and before Popiels' fenced their property, 
approximately seven adjacent properties were unfenced and constituted de facto common ground 
between and around the houses. The Popiels' fence complies with neighborhood standards, was 
approved by the Homeowners1 Association ("HOA")> but it exceeds the height restriction by 
approximately three to nine inches. The height is, however, consistent with the height of other 
fences in the subdivision. 
Popiels fenced their property for at least two reasons: to restrain and protect their 
33 
surviving dog, after one dog was killed by an automobile, and to prevent Mr. Weinstein form 
using their property to run his dog, Popiels did not obtain Mr. Weinstein's permission before 
they erected a fence that ran just inside their property line, where it adjoins Mr. Weinstein's 
property. The CC&Rs require that such permission be obtained. Mr. Weinstein withheld his 
permission for at least two reasons: first, he relied on the use of Popiels' property to extend his 
relatively small backyard to provide exercise and play for his dog, and he also cherished the 
"common" ground which he believes benefitted not just him, but all adjoining property owners. 
Mr. Weinstein claims he would never have bought his property if he had believed his neighbors 
could erect an adjoining fence over his objections. Two other adjoining property owners have 
given permission for the fence. There is a dispute whether Martins gave permission, but they 
have since sold their property, and they have never filed a foimal complaint or joined this 
lawsuit. Popiels did receive pre-approval for the fence from the HO A, but the approval letter 
failed to refer to the need to obtain permission from neighbors, and Mr. Weinstein had no notice 
of the construction until after it was accomplished 
When Mr. Weinstein pursued his objection with the HOA, after construction was 
complete, the HOA agreed that the approval letter lacked reference to the need for permission, 
but the officers of the HOA indicated that they believed the approval requirement was a courtesy 
provision, and not an absolute requirement. Because Mr. Weinstein persevered with his 
objections, the HOA then conducted a variance procedure to determine if the Association 
members were willing to grant a variance for the lack of permission. At the time of the meeting, 
Mr. Weinstein had never objected to the excessive height of the fence, and the height was not at 
issue. At the HOA meeting, homeowners in attendance voted 64 to zero in favor of the variance. 
That is not the required absolute majority of all homeowners, but unrebutted evidence establishes 
that when proxies were counted, the vote exceeded fifty percent Neither party presented 
evidence that proxies are not valid with respect to a variance vote. 
Based on the foregoing facts, and the conclusions of law set forth herein, the court finds 
for defendants on certain alternative bases. First, the court finds that the permission requirement 
is not a mere courtesy requirement, but is a condition of the contract between the Association and 
its members, and between the members themselves. Like all contractual conditions, obligations, 
or covenants, it is subject to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. As applied to a 
restriction on a property owner's right to fence his or her property, the covenant requires that the 
necessary permission not be unreasonably withheld. It may not be unreasonable to witlihold 
fencing permission when a view is substantially impaired, or for other valid aesthetic reasons, 
when the enjoyment of one's own property is impaired by the installation of a fence on a 
neighboring property, but it is unreasonable to witlihold permission because the fence impairs the 
use one wishes to make of the neighbors' property. That is, a use to which he has no right in law 
or equity in the first place. The court is sympathetic to Mr, Weinstein's desire to maintain an 
open and community use, with all the social and practical benefits that use implies, but the 
Popiels' property is simply not common area-
Second, the court does not believe that the permission requirement is a design element 
which would be subject to the variance procedure, but if it is the variance vote was valid and the 
requirement will not be applied in this case. However, the variance procedure is important for 
another reason. Mr. Weinstein did not object to the fence height until after the meeting, and the 
court finds that he has waived his objection to the height, but in the alternative, if that issue 
survives, the HOA vote, along with he existence of numerous fences that exceed the height 
restriction, is persuasive evidence that the HOA and a majority of its members, have waived the 
height requirement, both generally, and specifically as to the Popiels' fence. 
Third, and the final alternative basis, the court finds that even if the permission 
requirement and the height restriction are absolute, have not been waived, and no variance has 
been validly granted, based on the clear evidence, no substantial right of Mr, Weinstein has been 
impaired. His cognizable damages, if any, resulting from the installation and continued presence 
of the fence are nominal; specifically, they amount to one dollar. 
Based on the foregoing alternative determinations, both parties have prevailed to some 
degree. Accordingly, the court hereby ORDERS that the fence may remain as installed, Mr. 
Weinstein is awarded nominal damages of one dollar, and neither party is awarded attorney's 
fees or costs. This signed Ruling and Order shall be the Order of the court and no further Order 
is required. 
DATED this 10lh day of May,2002, 
By the Court: 
/ 
Roberta. Hilda, Distif* <|c%Jfld!e> }q 
